Abstract. When dealing with a certain class of physical systems, the mathematical characterization of a generic system aims to describe the phase portrait of all its possible states. Because they are defined only up to isomorphism, the mathematical objects involved are "schematic structures". If one imposes the condition that these mathematical definitions completely capture the physical information of a given system, one is led to a strong requirement of individuation for physical states. However, we show there are not enough qualitatively distinct properties in an abstract Hilbert space to fulfill such a requirement. It thus appears there is a fundamental tension between the physicist's purpose in providing a mathematical definition of a mechanical system and a feature of the basic formalism used in the theory. We will show how group theory provides tools to overcome this tension and to define physical properties.
In the mathematical literature, given a C*-algebra A, any normalized positive linear functional on it is by definition a state; here we allow the possibility that the set S of On the other hand, one can pursue a "descriptive perspective", and consider that the abstract mathematical characterization of a physical system encapsulates all the information about the system without the need of any further external interpretation.
Whereas the formalist perspective downplays the descriptive role of the mathematical definition of a physical system by demanding that a physical interpretation be also given, this other contrasting perspective confers full descriptive power on the mathematical formalism. On this viewpoint, one considers that if a physicist is given the abstract description of a given physical system and nothing more, she will nonetheless be able to recognize which physical system is being described. For example, if she studies the classical mechanical system defined by the triple {Γ, ω, H}, where (Γ, ω) = T*R equipped with its canonical symplectic form and H(q,p) = p 2 /2m, one expects her to recognize a free massive (non-relativistic) particle moving in a one-dimensional space.
To me, this is what Rovelli has in mind when he declares: "a dynamical system is completely defined by a presymplectic space (Σ, ω)" (Rovelli 2004, p. 101, my emphasis) . It is also the perspective adopted by Landsman when he criticizes the use of Hilbert spaces in Quantum Mechanics:
"all Hilbert spaces of a given dimension are isomorphic, so that one cannot characterize a physical system by saying that 'its Hilbert space of (pure) states is L 2 (R 3 )'." (Landsman 1998, p.6), For it is only when expecting full descriptive power to flow from the mathematical characterization of a physical system that worries about the fact there is only one infinitedimensional Hilbert space arise. From the formalist perspective, there is no reason why the fact that all Hilbert spaces are isomorphic should be seen as supplying the motivation to build an alternative, possibly more sophisticated, formalism for Quantum Mechanics.
Indeed, from that point of view one should never expect to fully characterize a physical system just by "saying that 'its Hilbert space of (pure) states is L 2 (R 3 )'", since an additional physical interpretation, that transcends the formal language, is needed.
The difference between both perspectives can be rendered precise using the elementary language of type theory as follows 3 . Consider first two different types: the "Physics type" T phys whose tokens are the mechanical systems, and the "Mathematics type" T math whose tokens are the mathematical objects used to describe the systems under consideration. The mathematical definition of a physical system may be seen as a map 6 from T phys to T math that, to every physical system S, associates the mathematical object D(S) describing it. Now, the properties ascribed to this map are what fundamentally distinguish the two perspectives. Indeed, the main claim of the descriptive perspective, as I understand it, is the injectivity of this map: This is of course tantamount to saying that any difference between two physical systems should be reflected in their respective mathematical descriptions-a requirement which is not imposed in the formalist perspective.
One might argue that the descriptive perspective is too naïve and that it is in principle impossible for an abstract, formal, mathematical description to capture "all there is" about a real, concrete, physical system. However, in common with other moves that attempt to undermine a research program by appeal to such extremely general arguments, I find this position sterile. Rather I believe that adopting the descriptive perspective as a working hypothesis and seeking to push it to its limits can yield interesting insights in theoretical physics, even if we are eventually led to reject the hypothesis. As Catren beautifully said of a different though not altogether unrelated topic:
"It is necessary to be programmatically ambitious in order to fail in a productive way" (Catren 2009, p. 470 ).
Thus, we will try to travel as far as possible along the road that the descriptive perspective suggests. As it will become progressively clearer, the faithfulness requirement imposes some strong conditions on the mathematical formalisms to be used for Mechanics. One of the main points of this paper is to show how some of the technical developments in the mathematical foundations of Mechanics arise as attempts to meet these conditions.
Mathematical objects as structures
It is fundamental to remark that the faithfulness requirement, imposed by the descriptive perspective, presupposes two underlying notions of identity: a first one between mathematical objects (denoted by = M ), and another independent notion of identity between physical systems (denoted by = P ). that indeed a certain quantum system was uniquely defined by the requirement of being an irreducible representation of (Weyl's form of) the canonical commutation relations:
the formalisms of Heisenberg (using the abstract Hilbert space of infinite complex matrices), Schrödinger (using the Hilbert space L 2 (R)) and Fock (using the Hilbert space ℓ 2 (N) of all square-summable sequences) appeared as three equivalent realizations of one and the same mathematical object describing one and the same physical system 5 .
The important point is that the founders of the quantum theory considered the physical system to be uniquely described because they considered equivalent representations as identical. Otherwise stated, two abstract descriptions of a quantum system had to be considered identical if isomorphic 6 . Thus, the above example shows how it clearly emerged, from the historical development of the theory, that for the purposes of Physics, the relevant notion of identity for mathematical objects was in fact isomorphism:
As is well explained in Rodin (2011), in dealing with mathematical objects defined up to isomorphism one enters into the realm of mathematical structuralism. In fact, this 4 This point on identity is precisely one of the deepest differences between type theory (contextual identity) and set theory (absolute identity). It is because of this difference that the language of type theory seems better adapted to our discussion. 5 For an explicit treatment of these formalisms, see for example (Gazeau 2009, pp. 13-18) . 6 Indeed, when working in the category of all representations (of a given C*-algebra) "equivalence of representations" is just another name for the general concept of "isomorphism". As long as the canonical commutation relations are implemented, it does not matter whether the Hilbert space describing the quantum particle is made of functions over a space, infinite sequences of complex numbers, or sections of a certain fiber bundle. It does not matter either whether the points of the space describing the classical particle are points of a cotangent bundle, of a Cartesian space or of the dual of a Lie algebroid. This is why Awodey calls them "schematic structures" (Awodey 2004, p. 62). The mathematical objects involved in the definitions of mechanical objects are schematic structures.
The requirement of individuation for physical states
We have already seen how Landsman expresses his dissatisfaction with the use of The classical analogue of this is Darboux's theorem: any two symplectic manifolds of the same dimension are locally isomorphic. For a given dimension, we thus get infinitely many non-isomorphic symplectic manifolds, but their differences are only of a topological nature. Whereas Hilbert spaces evidently fall short of accounting for the diversity of the Quantum realm and hence cannot be taken as an acceptable characterization of physical systems, it is not so clear whether the same conclusion can be drawn about the use of symplectic manifolds in Classical Mechanics. Undoubtedly, we are missing here further criteria that would allow us to decide when a type of structure is "descriptive enough" to be an acceptable candidate for characterizing physical systems.
The existence of numerically many non-isomorphic structures of a given type is surely one criterion, but it cannot be the only one.
In all situations considered so far, there was a two-fold move in order to mathematically capture all the physical information: first, the system was said to be characterized by the set of all its possible states; second, it was this set that was meant to be described by some mathematical space. At the end, one gets the so-called "phase portrait" of the system (Abraham and Marsden 1978, p. xviii). A state was intended to be described by a point of the symplectic manifold Γ in the classical Hamiltonian formalism, and by a ray of the Hilbert space H in the standard quantum formalism 9 . Now, recall that in the descriptive perspective, one expects the theoretical physicist to be able to extract, simply from the given abstract mathematical structure describing the system, all the relevant physical information. In particular, given an element of this structure-a point of the symplectic manifold or a ray of the Hilbert space-one expects her to be capable of recognizing the specific state of the system. But, for this to be possible, the mathematical structure describing a physical system must be such that its different elements can be properly distinguished. In other words, if the mathematical definition is all there is to know in order to completely determine a physical system, one is confronted with the following requirement:
Requirement of individuation for physical states: it must be possible, in practice, to qualitatively identify any specific physical state within the mathematical structure used to define the system.
As we now show, this requirement imposes, on the structures that can in principle characterize mechanical systems, much stronger conditions than the previous faithfulness requirement. To see this, let us unpack what the requirement of individuation is actually saying. Firstly, it is important to understand the difference between "being able to identify a physical state" and "being able to distinguish between two physical states". In a short paper from 1976, Quine introduced three different ways of distinguishing two objects.
According to him, two objects are (in decreasing order of discernibility) 9 A ray of a Hilbert space is a one-dimensional subspace.
• absolutely discernible if there exists a one-place predicate that is true of one object but not of the other (e.g. two spheres of different color),
• relatively discernible if there exists a two-place relation that is true of them in one order but not in the other (e.g. two spheres of the same color but different size),
• weakly discernible if there exists a two-place irreflexive relation that is true of them (e.g. two qualitatively identical spheres, as considered in (Black 1952)).
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One important motivation for introducing this distinction was reconciling Leibniz's Principle of Indiscernibles with the existence of some highly homogeneous mathematical objects-such as the Euclidean plane, where all points seem indiscernible from each other. The (somewhat irritating) question was then: "Since any predicate true of one given point of the Euclidean plane will also be true of any other point, how can you possibly know there is more than just one point in this plane?" Weak discernibility was meant to provide a rigorous answer to this: it allows you to determine how many identical iron spheres there are in Black's otherwise empty universe. However, a physicist dealing with a particular system will not only want to describe the number of different possible states. He will also need to make objective reference to a certain, particular state in such a way that any other physicist will understand which state he is referring to.
I say an element in a structure can be identified (or individuated) if there exists a one-place predicate that allows absolute discernibility from any other element. Thus, if a mathematical structure is to fulfill the requirement of individuation, physical states have to be individuated by 'objective' or 'structural' properties. In particular, these properties have to be invariant under any automorphism. This simple remark is actually very fruitful, for it furnishes a practical tool to detect the "amount of individuation" that can be provided within a given mathematical structure. Indeed, by the above definitions, it follows that two elements related by such an automorphism cannot be absolutely distinguished-and hence cannot be individuated either. In fact, the orbits of the group of automorphisms are the smallest subsets of the structure that can be identified or individuated 13 . The (internal) descriptive power of a structure is thus encapsulated in the action of its group of automorphisms, and we arrive at the following
consequence: if a physical system is to be completely characterized by a mathematical structure S (that constitutes its phase portrait), then its possible physical states ought to be described by the orbits of the automorphism group Aut(S).
To conclude this section, notice how this new point of view provides yet another way of understanding the lack of descriptive power of Hilbert spaces. Indeed, given an ndimensional Hilbert space H, its group of automorphisms is the group U(n) of unitary 13 transformations. Now, a pure state of a quantum system is supposed to be described by a ray of this Hilbert space, but the action of U(n) on the set of all rays is transitive: the projective Hilbert space is completely homogeneous and no physical state can be individuated. Indeed it turns out this property of homogeneity or maximal symmetry can even be used to define projective Hilbert spaces (Ashtekar and Schilling 1997, section III.B.).
Methods for introducing individuality into Quantum Mechanics
Let The main thesis of the present paper is that this tension has been one of the driving forces in the Foundations of (Quantum) Mechanics, in the sense that many of the developments in this field can be retrospectively understood as attempts to overcome it.
The second part of the work is devoted to a brief survey of some of the mathematical notions introduced in the quantum formalism in the light of this understanding.
Three approaches to introducing individuality
At this point, the essential problem we face in the standard quantum formalism is the lack of enough qualitative properties: given only an abstract Hilbert space, it is impossible to make unambiguous reference to a specific ray without appealing to any primitive thisness-this is the content of Weyl's previous citation 14 . But "science is averse to the use of the notion of haecceity, "primitive thisness", in order to individuate objects" (Dieks 2014, p. 43) . To avoid this, one option would be to discard Hilbert spaces from the outset and start looking for completely new mathematical structures that would do the job. However, the use of Hilbert spaces in the practice of Quantum Mechanics is so widespread and deep-rooted, that an alternative may be sought-namely, to retain Hilbert spaces but enrich them with further structure: i) consider projective Hilbert spaces as a sort of homogeneous underlying receptacle involved in the description of any physical system; and ii) describe a concrete and specific system with a (slightly) more sophisticated mathematical setting, that would somehow break this homogeneity and convey to the different physical states qualitative properties sufficient to distinguish them. In other words, address the problem of how to transform a mere numerical multiplicity into a multiplicity of qualitatively distinct elements 15 .
In the standard formalism, the key technical concept needed to implement this idea of "adding extra structure" is that of a representation: to describe a system, one should not consider a bare Hilbert space but, instead, a Hilbert space only insofar as it is the canvas on which some external information is instantiated. There are at least three different strategies that have been followed in mathematical Physics.
i)
Physical systems as representations of algebras. First, one can claim the crucial information about a physical system lies in the algebraic structure of the observables. Thus, a physical system would be described by the representation of an abstract C*-algebra A-that is, by a triple (A, H, π) where H is a Hilbert space and π is a morphism of C*-algebras from A to B(H), the algebra of all bounded operators. This road leads to the algebraic formulation of Quantum Mechanics (Strocchi 2005) and the theory of algebraic quantum fields (Haag 1996) .
ii) Physical systems as representations of groups. On the other hand, one can try to build up the theory by focusing on the notion of group, in which case the set of possible states is to be mathematically described by a unitary group representation-that is, by a triple (G, H, ρ) where G is now a group and ρ is a emergence of some qualitative properties: not all rays will be related to each other by an automorphism, and a certain amount of individuality has thereby been introduced.
Nonetheless, the question still remains: Are these new definitions acceptable? Do these newly introduced structures provide the means for conferring individuality on physical states? To answer this, we need to investigate how structural properties are defined and which substructures they allow us to individuate. In the next section, we shall explain the mechanism of individuation in the group-theoretical approach, leaving the analysis of the other two strategies for future research.
Properties in the group-theoretical approach
Let us restate the problem from the group-theoretic viewpoint. Essentially, the difficulty encountered with Hilbert spaces is that their group of automorphisms is too big:
there is only one orbit (the action of Aut(H) is transitive) and it is thus impossible to find invariant properties that would differentiate different subspaces of H. 
for any g' in G is equivalent to (G, H, ρ) , and the intertwining operator that achieves the isomorphism is precisely ρ(g). theoretical approach to the individuation of physical states leads naturally to the following conclusion:
Description of states and properties: if a specific quantum system is (described by) the schematic structure (G, H, ρ (Catren 2014)). The strength of this whole approach, which rests on an analysis of the theoretical means required to objectively single out specific quantum states, is that, not only do we recover Weyl's observation, but we also understand that it could not have been otherwise: quantum numbers must be indices of representations simply because they must be structural properties.
An example: the group S0(3) and angular momentum states
To illustrate the procedure of individuation in the group-theoretical setting, consider a quantum system whose only property is angular momentum. It can be, for example, a free spherical top. It is then customary to take the Hilbert space of states to be Thus, in this description that only uses Hilbert spaces and groups, there is a basis of states that can be discerned using a set of objective properties. Whereas elements of a bare projective Hilbert space did not possess any qualitative properties, the introduction of an abstract group has brought about an emergence of different qualitative properties and successfully transformed the homogeneous canvas of a numerical multiplicity into a multiplicity of qualitatively discernible states.
Conclusion
Among the most debated issues in the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, the interpretation of the wave function occupies a central place (Dorato and Laudisa, 2015) .
In this context, many of the arguments for or against a realist wave function ontology seem to rely heavily on the definition of a wave function as a complex-valued function over configuration space. But the mathematical developments in the foundations of Mechanics clearly show there is no reason to prefer a description of physical states in terms of functions over configuration space rather than, for example, in terms of abstract square-summable sequences. Therefore, before trying to build an ontology for the theory, it seems to me crucial to understand precisely how physical systems are described in the mathematical formalism of Mechanics. The aim of the paper was to start investigating this question, and to trace the consequences of taking such formal descriptions seriously.
The analysis paid special attention to the way (in)discernibility was handled. The results can be summarized as follows:
1. The mathematical objects used in the definitions of physical systems are schematic structures, insofar as they are defined only up to isomorphism. The precise nature of the elements in the structure is either a meaningless notion or an otiose one, and in any case should be irrelevant to any philosophical of the formalism of Quantum Mechanics.
2. Moreover, a quantum system cannot be mathematically characterized by a projective Hilbert space, since the elements of such a space are only weakly discernible. This is technically captured by the transitive action of the group of automorphisms. To introduce individuality and qualitative properties, one needs to add extra structure.
3. In the group-theoretical approach, the emergence of qualitative properties conferring individuality to the different states occurs through a mechanism of restriction: an abstract group G is introduced, conveying a physical meaning to a restricted set of the group of automorphisms. States are described as irreducible representations of some group and quantum properties, because of their structural nature, are necessarily indices characterizing them.
Strange as it may sound, this analysis shows there is no clear-cut understanding of what a wave function-i.e. a quantum state-actually is. At any rate, any sound definition will involve highly abstract entities, such as C*-algebras or the Heisenberg group. Therefore, wave function realists seem to be necessarily committed to being realist about these abstract schematic structures. They will thus be realist about a big part of pure Mathematics, and this is a step they may not want to take.
